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v.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court
to hear this appeal by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-22(3) (j), 1953 as amended.
Supreme

Court's

This statute sets forth the Utah

appellate

jurisdiction

over

"orders,

judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court

of

Appeals

jurisdiction."

does

not

have

original

appellate

The nature of this proceeding is an appeal

from a final order of Second District Court, the Honorable
Rodney S. Page, in and for Davis County, State of Utah.
order

of

that

Court found North

The

Salt Lake City's breed

specific vicious dog law to be constitutionally valid.

There

is no grant of original appellate jurisdiction to the Court
of Appeals as would be applicable to this case.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.
Salt

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that North

Lake

violative

City
of

Ordinance

substantive

13-20-16E
due

was

process,

not
as

vague

measured

and
by

constitutional standards?
II.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that

the North Salt Lake Ordinance does not violate constitutional
standards of equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and violate Article I,
Section 24 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
III.
the

evidence

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that
established

that
1

predominant

physical

characteristics are determinative of breed differentiation in
the species of dogs?
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENT XIV,
Section 1, [Citizenship - Due process of lawEqual protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ARTICLE I, SECTION 24:
[Uniform operation of law.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation.
RULE 52(a) UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
. • . . Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

In January 1987, the City Council of North

Salt Lake unanimously passed and adopted the North Salt Lake
Animal

Control

ordinance

was

Ordinance, Chapter
thereafter

amended

13-20-1

et

on August

seq.

The

4, 1987, to

primarily provide an administrative remedy for any person or
entity challenging enforcement of the ordinance.
2.

On or about February 3, 1987, Kate Greenwood,
2

Andrew

Greenwood,

Ralph

Greenwood, and

the American Dog

Breeders Association (hereinafter referred to collectively as
"Greenwoods") filed suit against the City claiming (a)

that

the provisions of the ordinance constituted a "taking of
property" without due process in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
violated

their

Fourteenth

(b)

Amendment

that the ordinance
rights

of

"equal

protection" because the language was too vague and ambiguous
to be enforceable, and
overinclusive

and

relationship to

(c)

that the ordinance was both

underinclusive

and

bore

no

rational

its objective, making its enforcement an

"unconstitutional

exercise

of

police

power"

under

the

Fourteenth Amendment.
3.
is

some

The North Salt Lake Animal Control ordinance

twenty-two

(22)

typewritten

pages

long.

The

particular language which is the subject of this lawsuit,
however, is as follows:
Section 13-20-01:
"22.
VICIOUS ANIMAL:
Any animal which is
dangerously aggressive or uncontrollable, including
but not limited to, any animal which has bitten or
in any manner attacked any person or animal. Any
animal by its unique nature or breeding which has
known propensities to be aggressive towards any
person or animal."
Section 13-20-16:
"A.
PREMISES, MUZZLE: It shall be unlawful for
the owner of any fierce, dangerous, or vicious
animal to permit such animal to go or be off the
premises of the owner unless such animal is under
restraint and properly muzzled as to prevent it
from injuring any person or property."
3

"E.
HEREDITARY CHARACTERISTICS: Certain breeds
of dogs which by their unique hereditary
characteristics, owner training or instruction, or
mistreatment, have a propensity to be vicious.
These breeds include, but are not limited to the
Bull Terrier, American Staffordshire Terrier,
Staffordshire Bull Terrier, Tosa, Shar-pei, and any
dog determined to be vicious under Subsection B of
this Section."
"P.

LICENSING REQUIREMENTS:

The dogs identified under this Section:
1. Must be licensed under the procedures and
fees set forth in this ordinance.
2. Must be kept in a fenced yard, dog run, or
other structure which is at least 6 feet in height,
by 6 feet wide, by 10 feet in length.
3. Must be on a leash and properly muzzled
when they are out of a fenced area.
4.
Must at the time of licensing, provide
proof of a fully paid homeowners or rental
insurance policy containing a personal liability
clause in the amount of $100,000.
5.
The insurance policy, agent and number
will be recorded upon licensing, and the agent will
be notified if the dog is cited for violating this
chapter.
6.
These requirements must be met before a
dog license will be issued.
Section 13-20-31.1:
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY:
Any person required to
license any animal under the provisions of this
ordinance, or any person who is or may be subject
to the enforcement of any provision of this
ordinance in a civil or criminal proceeding who
disagrees with the interpretation or application
of any provision of this ordinance shall make a
written request to the city manager to determine
whether and how the provisions of this ordinance
apply to him or her and to the animals subject to
the provisions of this ordinance. During the time
4

that the written request is being considered by the
city manager, no criminal action shall be enforced
under this ordinance against the person that has
made the request. The city manager shall rule on
the request within five days after it is received
by the city manager.
The decision of the city
manager shall advise the recipient of whether and
how the provisions of this ordinance applies to the
request, and if any provision applies, the decision
shall inform the recipient of how many days the
person has to comply with the ordinance before the
ordinance will be enforced against him or her and
the animal which may be affected by the ordinance.
If any person affected by the provisions of this
ordinance takes the position that his or her animal
is not within the classifications established by
this ordinance, he or she shall make a written
request to the city manager under this section.
The city manager may appoint an expert to advise
him on matters requiring special knowledge. Where
an expert is required to advise the city manager,
the city manager may delay his decision until he
has received the recommendation of the expert.
Nothing in this ordinance requires the city to
dismiss any criminal or civil action brought by the
city pending his decision.
4.

The matter was heard by the Honorable Rodney S.

Page, District Court Judge for the Second Judicial District
Court in a three day non-jury trial on January 12, 13, and
27, 1989.
5.

On

May

Memorandum

Decision,

Ordinance,

Section

8,

1989,

finding

13-20-01

that
et

Judge
the

seq. was

Page

issued

his

North

Salt

Lake

constitutionally

valid under the due process and equal protection clauses of
the

United

Constitution.

States

Constitution

and

the

Utah

State

The trial court determined, however, that

part of the definitional provision of "vicious animal" found
in section 13-20-1(22) of the ordinance, which defined "Any
5

animal

by

its

unique

nature

or

breed

which

has

known

propensities to be aggressive towards any person or animal"
as vicious, was constitutionally void.
6.

On July 14, 1989, the trial court entered its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment.
7.

On August 17, 1989, Greenwoods filed their

Notice of Appeal seeking review by the Utah Supreme Court of
the trial court's Findings and Judgment.
8.

The three issues raised by the Greenwoods in

their appeal of the trial court's findings and judgment,
involve claims that the trial court erred in determining that
the North

Salt Lake ordinance was constitutionally

valid

under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
the Utah State Constitution.
claim

More particularly, Greenwoods

(a) that the trial court erred in finding that the

ordinance did not violate their Fourteenth Amendment rights
of "equal protection", in that it was not void for vagueness,
and

(b) that the trial court committed error in determining

that the ordinance was not overinclusive nor underinclusive,
and that its provisions bore a rational relationship to its
objective, making its enforcement a "constitutional exercise
of police power" under the Fourteenth Amendment, and finally,
(c) that

the

trial

court

committed

reversible

error

in

finding that the evidence at trial established that the breed
of a dog is typically determined by its predominant physical

6

characteristics [and registration].1
9.
contend

The City of North Salt Lake as respondents,

that

all

three

of

the

challenges

asserted

by

Greenwoods in this appeal, are without merit.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Respondent, the City
issue

with

Greenwood's

some

of

Statement

the

of North Salt Lake, takes

representations

of Relevant

made

Facts, and

in

the

submit

the

following testimony from the trial court record in support of
their response to the issues raised therein.
Concerning the issue of vagueness, trial testimony
established

that

determination

is

the

visual

typical

method

identification

predominate physical characteristics.
238-240;
2;

of

based

dog
on

(Record, Day

breed

a dog's
1, pp.

Record, Day 1, p. 51. lines 5-25 and p. 52, line 1-

Record, Day 1, p. 24, lines 2-11; Record, Day 1, p. 60,

lines 14-21;

Record, Day 1, p. 213-218;

Record, Day 1, p.

232, lines 6-25 and p. 233, lines 1-12;
21, lines 14-17;

Record, Day 2, p.

Record, Day 3, p. 61, lines 10-25 and p.

62, lines 1-14).
The Greenwoods seem to also discount the expert
testimony of Dr. Gary Peterson, wherein Dr. Peterson, after
being

qualified

as

an

expert

in dog

1

Greenwoods agree that the
determined by its registration.
7

identification

breed

of

dog

may

and

be

characteristics of specific breeds, responded as follows;
Q.

"Doctor, in your opinion, based on a visual
inspection of the predominate physical
characteristics of the breeds listed in the
AKC, is it possible to identify the breed of
any given dog?"

A.

"Certainly of the true breed, yes. They fit
in certain standards.
Of the major
characteristics if they are dominate major
characteristics they should fit into a general
breed standard."

(Record, Day 3, p. 61, lines 10-17).
Greenwoods also argue that the language of Section
13-20-16E which imposes six additional safeguards on dogs
deemed

to

be

include, but

"vicious", and

which

are not limited

reads

"These

breeds

to...", fails to give the

reasonable person notice if his dog is contemplated by the
ordinance. (Appellant's brief at 6 and 12).
appellant has overlooked

the

Unfortunately,

fact that Section 13-20-16E

refers to Section 13-20-16B which defines

"Uncontrollable

Vicious Animal", and by reference makes such animals subject
to the provisions of Section 13-20-16E.

Inasmuch as there

could be breeds of dogs deemed vicious under

13-20-16B,

different than those specifically listed in 13-20-16E, the
language "not limited to" is clear on its face. (See Record,
Day 3, p. 46, lines 11-25, p. 47, lines 1-22).
The

Greenwoods

arbitrariness

claiming

involved

a

in

viciousness.

dog's

continue

their

that training
aggressiveness

(Appellant's brief at 6 ) .
8

argument

is the
or

only

for

factor

propensity

for

Dr. Peterson testified as follows:
Qe

"Ok. Do you have an opinion as to, ah, to the
historical background of the breeding of the
Pit Bull and how that breed might have been
affected with regard to those characteristics?

A.

"Well from my understanding of the historical
background these breeds were used primarily
for Pit fighting, starting in the middle ages.
Ah, they were bred for those characteristics.

Q.

"Ok. And is it your understanding that not
only can a dog be bred for physical
characteristics, but also
behavioral
characteristics?

A.

"Yes I think so."

(Record, Day 3, p. 64, lines 19-25 and p. 65, lines
1-5) .
Lou Lynes, also testified that:
Q.

(Mr. Christiansen):
Mr. Lynes could you
describe briefly for me, the characteristics
of a Pit Bull in your mind that make it unique
from all other dogs?

A.

Well when we describe the breed as a Pit Bull,
the originally bred dog was from a Terrier and
a Bull Dog, we are looking at a breed that in
its conception was bred primarily for the
fighting aspects of the breed itself. Then we
have gone over into the Staffordshire Terrier
and other breeds off of that. But basically
the breed is, ah, originally was bred for a
fighting dog and has been classified as the
Pit Bull or the Pit Dog or the dog used in the
pit for pit fighting.

(Record, Day 2, p. 138, lines 21-25 and p. 139,
lines 1-7).
The most telling flaw in appellant's argument is
their assertion that

"...the only valid determination of

breed is by having a dog1a registration papers or pedigree
charts." (Appellant's brief at 6 ) .
9

The record is replete

with testimony from both sides that substantiate the fact
that

observation

of

a

dog's

predominant

physical

characteristics is the method used in determining its breed.
(Record, Day 1, pp. 238-240;
25 and p. 52, line 1-2;

Record, Day 1, p. 51. lines 5-

Record, Day 1, p. 24, lines 2-11;

Record, Day 1, p. 60, lines 14-21;
218;

Record, Day 1, pp. 213-

Record, Day 1, p. 232, lines 6-25 and p. 233, lines 1-

12;

Record, Day 2, p. 21, lines 14-17;

Record, Day 3, p.

61, lines 10-25 and p. 62, lines 1-14).

Even the breed

established in a dog's registration papers is based upon its
predominant physical characteristics.

(Record, Day 1, p.

231, lines 8-25 and p. 232, lines 1-5).

In addition, the

City has never taken issue with the fact that the breed of a
dog

cannot be determined

from blood

or tissue analysis.

(Record, Day 1, p. 43, lines 19-25).
Contrary to the Greenwood's assertions (Appellant's
brief at 7 and 8), numerous witnesses testified that the "pit
bull"

breeds

of

dogs

possess

unique

hereditary

characteristics which make them more vicious or dangerous
than other breeds. (Record, Day 3, p. 7, lines 20-25, p. 8,
lines 1-25; Record, Day 2, p. 138, lines 21-25 and p. 139, p.
140, lines 1-7;

Record, Day 2, p. 141, lines 12-25;

Day 2, p. 174, lines 11-14;

Record,

Record, Day 3, p. 10, lines 7-

25, p. 11, lines 1-16; Record Day 3, p. 46, lines 11-25, p.
47, lines 1-4; Record, Day 3, p. 51, lines 8-25, p. 52, lines
1-23;

Record, Day 3, p. 62, lines 15-25, p. 63, and p. 64,
10

lines 1-8).
The Greenwoods also argue in their brief that dog
bite reports are inconclusive in showing a higher incidence
of attack and biting for the "pit bull" when compared to
other breeds.

(Appellant's brief at 8).

However, testimony

at trial did indicate that in North Salt Lake during the year
1987, there was one bite for every four pit bulls registered
as compared to one bite for every twenty dogs that were
registered of all other breeds.
20-23).

(Record, Day 2, p. 76, lines

In 1988, the ratio in North Salt Lake was one bite

for every

five pit bulls compared to one bite for every

thirty-five other breeds registered.

(Record, Day 3, p. 76,

lines 1-4).
In the neighboring city of Salt Lake, where bite
statistics had been tabulated for a number of years, the "pit
bull" dogs also had a higher bite incidence than most other
dogs. (Record, Day 2, p. 169, lines 15-19).

Testimony at

trial also established that the "pit bull" was capable of
causing severe harm and even death to its victims, (Record,
Day 2, p. 154, lines 10-25 and p. 155, lines 1-22;

Record,

Day 3, p. 6, lines 11-16), and that animal control officers
typically handle "pit bulls" more cautiously and different
than any other dog.

(Record, Day 2, p. 141, lines 12-25;

Record, Day 3, p. 42, lines 14-25 and p. 43, lines 1-5).
As a result of several attack incidents involving
the "pit bull" breeds within the limits of the City, North
11

Salt Lake enacted the ordinance to protect the health, safety
and welfare of its citizens.

(Record, Day 2, pp. 119-124).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly held that the North Salt
Lake ordinance met the constitutional requirements for due
process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 24
of the Utah State Constitution.

The findings and judgment of

the trial court are substantiated by the evidence adduced at
trial, and the caselaw upon which the trial court's decision
is based.
The trial court correctly found that the breed of a
dog

is determined by

registration or by

its predominant

physical characteristics, and, that to be registered, a dog
must possess the predominant physical characteristics of the
breed as set forth by the registering association.

Further,

the lower court properly found that the breed of a dog is
determined by a visual inspection of the dog's predominant
characteristics,

and

that

the

"pit

bull"

dogs

manifest

certain unique physical characteristics

so that they are

easily discernible

Because of their

unique

combination

from other breeds.
of

proportionate

strength,

agility,

aggressiveness, courage, intelligence, high tolerance

for

pain, tenacity and gameness, they pose a greater threat than
other dogs to the health and safety of the citizens of the
12

city so as to warrant additional regulation.
The

trial

court

properly

concluded

that

the

Greenwoods failed at trial to overcome the strong presumption
in favor of the ordinance by a clear and compelling showing.
Because this case did not involve a fundamental right, nor
did it involve a suspect class, the trial court correctly
determined

that

the

object

of the enactment

involved

a

legitimate state interest and that its classification bore a
rational relationship to the objective sought.
Finally, the trial court correctly found that the
ordinance was not vague in that it is sufficiently clear so
as to inform the ordinary reader of common intelligence what
breeds of dogs were subject to the ordinance.
finding

that the predominant

The court's

characteristics of the "pit

bull" breed are such that a person of ordinary intelligence
and common sense would be able to ascertain if his particular
animal was of the breed specified is extensively supported by
the evidence.
Because the Greenwoods have failed to meet their
burden in showing that the trial court erred in its decision,
accordingly,

the

judgment

of

affirmed.

13

the

trial

court

must

be

ARGUMENT
I.
THE GREENWOODS HAVE FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF
SHOWING SUBSTANTIAL ERROR ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT
SO AS TO WARRANT A CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT
As appellants, the Greenwoods bear the substantial
burden

of

establishing

reversible

error.

that

Their

the

challenge

trial
to

court
the

committed

findings

and

judgment of the trial court requires that they sustain the
burden of showing "clearly erroneous" reversible error.

Rule

52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The appropriate standard of review applicable to a
challenge of the trial court's findings and judgment is that
the appellate court should regard the trial court's finding
and judgment with a presumption of validity and correctness.
Rule 52(a) Utah R.Civ.P.; Doelle v. Bradley. 124 Ut.Adv.Rep.
20 (Utah 1989);

Hatcheson v. Gleave. 632 P.2d 815 (1981);

Kohler v. Garden City. 639 P.2d 162 (1981).
The Greenwoods are required to sustain that burden
of showing error, based upon a review by the appellate court
with a presumption of validity to the findings and judgment
of the trial court, and that the record be construed in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial
court level.
disturbed
support

The decision of the trial court should not be

unless
for

such

the

appellate

reversal

in

court
the

14

finds

evidence.

substantial
Doelle

v.

Bradley, supra, 124 Ut.Adv.Rep at 21;

Hatcheson v. Gleave,

supra: Kohler v. Garden City, supra.
To

successfully

attack

findings

of

fact,

an

appellant must first marshall all the evidence supporting the
findings and then demonstrate that, even if viewed in light
most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the findings. Doelle v. Bradley, 124
Ut.Adv.Rep 20, 21 (1989); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance
Company, 776 P. 2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); In re Estate of
Bartell. 776 P. 2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); Scharf v. BMG Corp.,
700 P. 2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

The legal sufficiency of

the evidence is determined under Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides: "Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(A).

A trial court's

factual finding is deemed " clearly erroneous" only if it is
against the clear weight of evidence.

Reid v. Mutual of

Omaha Insurance Company, supra, 776 P. 2d at 899-900; In re
Estate of Bartell. supra, 776 P. 2d at 886; See Western Kane
County Special Service. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co.,
744 P. 2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987).
In

the

present

case, the

Greenwoods

have

not

attempted to marshal the evidence in support of the trial
court's findings and demonstrate that the evidence supporting
15

the findings is legally insufficient.

Their brief presents

the conflicting evidence in light most favorable to their
position and largely ignores the contrary

evidence.

There

is therefore no reason to disturb the trial courtfs findings.
The Greenwoods base their appeal on basically three
areas

in

which

they

reversible error.

claim

the

trial

court

committed

First they claim that the trial court

erred when it found that ordinance 13-20-16E was not vague
and violative of substantive due process.
at pp. 10-20).

(Appellant's Brief

Secondly, they claim that the trial court

committed reversible error when it found that the North Salt
Lake Ordinance was not discriminatory and did not violate the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah State
Constitution.

(Appellant's brief pp. 20-24).

Finally, the Greenwoods claim that the court erred
in determining that the evidence at trial established that
the

combination

characteristics

of
or

a

dog's

registration

predominant
determine

physical
its

breed.

(Appellant's brief pp. 24-25).
On the issue of substantive due process, and more
particularly, vagueness, the trial court, after hearing three
full days of testimony from some sixteen witnesses, many of
which were experts in the field of breed identification, held
that "the breeds of "pit bull" terriers specified in the
North Salt Lake City ordinance are breeds of such unique
16

physical

characteristics

distinguishable
characteristics
ordinary

from
of

if

specified."

his

other

they

breeds.

are

reasonably

The

predominant

the breed are such that

intelligence

ascertain

that

and common

particular

a person of

sense would be able to

animal

was

of

the

breed

(Trial Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, hereinafter "Findings", p. 10, para. 24). The evidence
adduced

at

trial

repeatedly

affirmed

the

unique

characteristics of the "pit bull" breeds of dogs which makes
their identification readily ascertainable.

(See Statement

of Relevant Facts, supra).
The Greenwood's second claim that the trial court
erred in determining the ordinance was not discriminatory,
and

thus

not

violative

of

equal

protection

under

the

Fourteenth Amendment and the Utah State Constitution is also
without merit.

The trial court, again, after considering all

of the evidence presented to it and applying the well-settled
principles

of

law

surrounding

the

doctrine

of

equal

protection, held "that there was a rational basis for the
North Salt Lake City Council to have determined that the "pit
bull" breeds do have a unique combination of inherited traits
which, when coupled with owner training and instruction and
mistreatment, cause them to have a greater propensity to be
vicious."

(Findings

p.

10,

para.

23).

Relative

to

Greenwood's claim that the ordinance unlawfully discriminated
against "pit bulls", the trial court found that "the fact
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that the ordinance was not extended to other breeds similarly
situated or that it did not extend to all of the evils it
could have is not a basis for constitutional challenge."
(Findings p. 11, para. 25).
Lastly, the court's finding that the breed of a dog
is

determined

by

either

its

registration

or

predominant

physical characteristics (Findings p. 3, para. 9), and that
for a dog to be registered it must possess the predominant
physical

characteristics

of

the

particular

breed

as

established by the registering association (Finding at p. 3,
para. 10), is supported throughout the record via testimony
of witnesses on both sides.
evidence does not support

Appellant's

claim that the

such a finding borders on the

ridiculous.
Based upon the evidence adduced at trial, again by
witnesses for both of the parties, the court found that "the
combination of predominant physical characteristics determine
the dog's breed." (Findings p. 3, para. 12.) "The breed of
most dogs can be determined by visual
particular

dog's

predominant

(Findings at p. 3, para. 13).

physical

inspection of the
characteristics."

Further, that " All of the

"Pit bull" breeds manifest unique physical characteristics of
the breed generally so that they are easily discernible from
other breeds." (Findings at p. 3, para. 14).
Clearly,

the

trial

court

was

very

careful

to

consider each of the issues which the Greenwoods have raised
18

on appeal.
evidence

The trial court heard and received extensive

on the issues

of vagueness

and

substantive due

process, equal protection, and the related factual question
of breed identification.

The standard of appellate review as

enumerated in Rule 52(a), and recent decisions of the Utah
Supreme Court, dictate that appellants bear a significant
burden to show the trial court committed substantial error in
making the findings and judgment which it did.

The legal

presumption that the trial court's findings and judgment are
valid and correct must be overcome by a compelling showing
that the trial court committed reversible error.
The Greenwoods have not made such a showing nor
have

they

overcome

that

burden,

particularly

when

one

considers that the record on review must be construed in the
light most favorable to the City of North Salt Lake in this
case.

The evidence, on both sides at the trial level, is

simply too overwhelming to make such a showing.
II.
THE GREENWOODS FAILED AT TRIAL TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF
OVERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY
WHICH ATTACHES TO THE ORDINANCE
In reviewing an ordinance or statute to ascertain
its constitutionality, certain rules of construction must be
applied:
(a)

A legislative enactment is presumed to be

valid and in conformity with the Constitution.
City v. Savaae. 541 P.2d

Salt Lake

1035, 1037, (Utah 1979); Trade
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Commission

v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., Utah

2d 431, 446

P.2d 958 (1968); Snow v. Keddinaton. 113 Utah 325, 195 P. 2d
234 (1948).
(b)

It should not be held to be invalid unless it

is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be incompatible with
some particular Constitutional provision. Id.
(c)

The

burden

of

showing

invalidity

of

an

ordinance or statute is upon the one who makes the challenge.
Salt Lake City V. Savage, supra, 541 P.2d at 1037;

Trade

Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., supra.
In the case of State v. Packard 122 Utah 369, 373,
250 P.2d 561, 563 (1952), it was stated:
It is recognized that statutes should not be
declared
unconstitutional
if there
is
any
reasonable basis upon which they may be sustained
as falling within the constitutional framework
[citations omitted], and that a statute will not be
held void for uncertainty if any sort of sensible,
practical effect may be given it.
[Citations
omitted.] Id.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Roth v. U.S. 354
U.S. 476, 491, (1956), said:
. . . This Court, however, has consistently held
that lack of precision is not itself offensive to
the requirements of due process.
". . . [T]he
Constitution
does
not
require
impossible
standards"; all that is required is that the
language "conveys sufficiently definite warning as
to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practices . . . "
United States
v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 91
I.Ed. 1877.
The case of Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of Police
Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, 7 Cal.3d 64, 101
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Cal.Rptr.

768, 773, 496 P.2d

840, 845

(1972), is also on

point:
. . . It should be kept in mind that there are an
infinite variety of activities or conduct which
could result in potential or actual danger to the
"peace, health, safety, convenience, good morals,
and general welfare" of the public. A municipality
cannot reasonably be expected to isolate and
specify those precise activities or conduct which
are intended to be proscribed.
As stated in
Daniel. quoting from an earlier case, "To make a
statute sufficiently certain to comply with
constitutional requirements [of due process of law]
it is not necessary that it furnishes detailed
plans and specifications of the acts or conduct
prohibited." . . . Id.
There
ordinances

is

no

concerning

question
the

that

keeping, use

a

city
and

may

enact

enjoyment

of

animals, including dogs, within its borders, under its police
power.

7th Ed. McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations,

Sec. 24.284 (1981), 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations, Sec.
212,

218.

A

city's

police

power

extends

even

to the

destruction of dogs in proper cases. As stated in McQuillan,
Municipal Corporations, supra;
From time immemorial these animals have been
considered as holding their lives at the will of
the legislative power.
The primary purpose of
legislation for the destruction of dogs without
redress to their owner is the protection of persons
and property.
Such legislation is justifiable
under the police power to protect life, health and
property and under power to declare and abate
nuisances.
Id. Section 24.289 at 140.
In this case, the governing body of the City of
North Salt Lake made a legislative determination that the
keeping of certain breeds of dogs (generically "pit bulls"
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and certain other "fighting dogs") within the city limits of
North Salt Lake, without additional regulation, poses such a
threat to the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of
North Salt Lake.

The governing body's decision was based

upon evidence of the inherent aggressiveness of such dogs;
the unpredictability of these breeds of dogs; their potential
to harm

its citizens; and, the inadequacy

of protection

measures which can be taken by owners of said breeds to
restrain them from coming into contact with members of the
general public and other animals.
The fact that the City of North Salt Lake has
chosen to regulate only these certain breeds in the manner it
has, does not make the ordinance invalid.

As long as that

regulation bears a real and substantial

relation to the

public health, safety, morals or general welfare, it must be
upheld by the court.

Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953 (Utah

1983); City of Warren v. Testa. 461 N.E.2d 1354 (Ohio Com.
PI. 1983).
In a case very similar to ours, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was
called

upon

to

review

the

constitutionality

Pennsylvania's "Pit Bull" ordinance.

of Chester,

That city's ordinance

specified that "Pit Bulls are considered dangerous dogs and
potentially hazardous to the community."

See opinion in

Starkey v. Township of Chester, 628 FoSupp. 196, 197 (EoD.Pa.
1986).

The ordinance further required that a license be
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purchased for $500 for each dog less than three, and $3,000
per dog above three.

Owners were required to post a $20,000

injury bond, confine their dogs to a secure place, be leashed
and muzzled when not confined, and be destroyed or removed
from the township if they attacked any person. Id.
In the Starkey v. Township of Chester, supra, case,
the

plaintiffs

claimed

that

the

ordinance

was

(1)

discriminatory for applying just to pit bulls, thus violating
the plaintiff's

Fourteenth Amendment rights, (2) that it

violated their First Amendment rights, (3) their due process
rights, (4) that it violated the interstate commerce clause,
and finally, (5) that it imposed license fees for pit bulls
and no other breeds and that the fees were not "reasonably
related to the costs of the costs of the license fees." Id.
at 197.
The court held that despite plaintiff's claims, the
ordinance met the traditional rational basis test for judging
equal

protection

under

the

Fourteenth

Amendment.

The

Starkey. supra, court also found that it was reasonable for
the township to determine that pit bulls are dangerous.

The

court states, "The township does not have to regulate every
dangerous animal at the same time in the same manner to pass
constitutional muster." Id. at 197. The court concluded, the
"township has not gone too far, insofar as the present record
shows in regulating, licensing and charging fees for pit
bulls (Citations omitted).

The First Amendment and Commerce
23

Clause claims are frivolous on this record." Id. 197-98.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE NORTH SALT LAKE
ORDINANCE, SECTION 13-20-16E WAS NOT VAGUE NOR
VIOLATIVE OF THE GREENWOOD'S SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS, AS MEASURED BY CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
The

Greenwood's

claim

that

the

trial

court

committed reversible error because the language of the North
Salt

Lake

ordinance

is too vague and ambiguous to meet

constitutional muster is without merit.

Greenwoods argue

that the trial court was wrong in not making a finding that
the ordinance was too vague and violated their substantive
due process rights.

Despite overwhelming evidence at trial

to the contrary, they claim that it is impossible for dog
owners or law enforcement officers to readily determine the
breeds of dogs specified in the ordinance. (See Appellant's
Brief at 11-14).
Before

the

court

ever

gets

to

that

question,

however, they must first determine if the ordinance will
significantly compromise any First Amendment protections.

As

stated in 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, Section 66:
"Where a statute or regulation is clear as applied
to him, he cannot challenge the statute on the
ground that it is vague as applied to others, at
least in the absence of a regulation of a First
Amendment freedom. The First Amendment vagueness
doctrine cannot be invoked by a party who is within
the hard core prohibitions of an otherwise valid
statute or regulation whose outer limit may be
vague as to others." Emphasis added.
Where no fundamental or First Amendment rights are
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involved, the appellant cannot raise the issue of vagueness
as it applies to others.

The Greenwoods attack the North

Salt Lake ordinance on the ground that the ordinance is vague
as

applied

situated.

to

themselves

and

other

persons

similarly

"In order to challenge a statute for vagueness, a

litigant must show that the statute is vague as applied to
his conduct,...[W]here a statute or regulation is clear as
applied

to him, he cannot challenge the statute on the

grounds that it is vague as applied to others,...11

16 C.J.S.

Constitutional Law, Section 66b, at 179-80 (1985).
Where

no

fundamental

constitutional

or

First

Amendment rights are involved, to succeed, the appellant must
demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications.
Hoffman

Village

Estate, 102

of Hoffman

S.Ct. 1186

Estates

(1982).

vs. Flipside,
Therein it was

stated:
"In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and
vagueness of a law, a court's first task is to
determine whether the enactment reaches a
substantial amount of Constitutionally protected
conduct.
If it does not, then the overbreadth
challenge must fail. The Court should then examine
the facial vagueness challenge, and assuming the
enactment implicates no constitutionally protected
conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the
enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications." (p.1191) (Emphasis supplied).
See also. State v. Hoffman. 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987).
The Greenwoods apparently make no claim that their
First Amendment rights have been affected by the North Salt
Lake ordinance, hence their assertion that the ordinance is
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overbroad must fail.

The standard of review then focuses on

whether the language of the ordinance is impermissibly vague
in all of its applications. Id.
1. ADEQUATE NOTICE
The Greenwoods cite the U.S. Supreme Court case of
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)# as support
for their claim that the North Salt Lake ordinance is vague
and

violative

of

their

substantive

due

process

rights.

(Appellant's brief at 11).
The Grayned, supra, case involved a challenge to
the

Rockford

City

ordinance

which

made

it

unlawful

to

willfully make a noise that disturbs or tends to disturb the
peace and good order of a school session.

Grayned, who was a

participant in a public demonstration outside a Rockford High
School

was

ordinance.

charged

with

violating

the

Rockford

noise

He argued that his First Amendment rights had

been violated, and that the ordinance was vague and deprived
him of his substantive due process rights.
after

applying

the

strict

scrutiny

for

The Court, even
First

Amendment

claims, held that the ordinance was not invalid. 408 U.S. at
121.
In the case at bar, Greenwoods argue that the North
Salt Lake ordinance fails to provide the average person of
ordinary intelligence fair and adequate notice of what breeds
are covered by the ordinance. (Appellant's brief at p. 12).
However, the ordinance specifically enumerates at Section 1326

20-16E the Bull Terrier, the American Staffordshire Terrier,
Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire Bull Terrier, American
Pit

Bull

Terrier,

Tosa,

Shar-pei,

and

any

other

dog

determined to be vicious under subsection B. (North Salt Lake
Ordinances, Section 13-20-16E).
specific

finding

that

the

The trial court below made a
Bull

Terrier,

the

American

Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire
Bull

Terrier,

referred

to

American

as

characteristics

"pit

Pit

Bull

bulls")

Terrier,

"manifest

of the breed generally

(generically

unique

physical

so that

they are

easily discernible from other breeds." (Findings at p. 3,
para. 14}.

Obviously,

if

a dog is

not

registered as one of

the above breeds, and if it does not manifest the predominate
physical characteristics of the named breeds, it would not be
subject to the ordinance.
Greenwoods also argue that the language of Section
13-20-16E which imposes six additional safeguards on dogs
deemed

to

be

include, but

"vicious",
are not

and

which

reads

"These

breeds

limited to...", fails to give the

reasonable person notice if his dog is contemplated by the
ordinance. (Appellant's brief at 12).

Unfortunately, they

have overlooked the fact that Section 13-20-16E refers to
Section

13-20-16B

which

defines

"Uncontrollable

Vicious

Animal", and by reference makes such animals subject to the
provisions of Section 13-20-16E.

Inasmuch as there could be

breeds of dogs deemed vicious under 13-20-16B, different than
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those specifically

listed in 13-20-16B, the language "not

limited to" is clear on its face.
2.

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY

In their brief, the Greenwoods totally ignore the
fact that the North Salt Lake ordinance also makes provision
for an administrative remedy for any person aggrieved by its
application.

Section 13-20-31.1 states as follows:

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY:
Any person required to
license any animal under the provisions of this
ordinance, or any person who is or may be subject
to the enforcement of any provision of this
ordinance in a civil or criminal proceeding who
disagrees with the interpretation or application
of any provision of this ordinance shall make a
written request to the city manager to determine
whether and how the provisions of this ordinance
apply to him or her and to the animals subject to
the provisions of this ordinance. During the time
that the written request is being considered by the
city manager, no criminal action shall be enforced
under this ordinance against the person that has
made the request. The city manager shall rule on
the request within five days after it is received
by the city manager.
The decision of the city
manager shall advise the recipient of whether and
how the provisions of this ordinance applies to the
request, and if any provision applies, the decision
shall inform the recipient of how many days the
person has to comply with the ordinance before the
ordinance will be enforced against him or heir and
the animal which may be affected by the ordinance.
If any person affected by the provisions of this
ordinance takes position that his or her animal is
not within the classifications established by this
ordinance, he or she shall make a written request
to the city manager under this section. The city
manager may appoint an expert to advise him on
matters requiring special knowledge.
Where an
expert is required to advise the city manager, the
city manager may delay his decision until he has
received the recommendation of the expert. Nothing
in this ordinance requires the city to dismiss any
criminal or civil action brought by the city
pending his decision.
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The effect of this provision is to allow any person
who may be concerned about the application of the ordinance
to him or her, an additional forum for review and protection.
3.

ENFORCEMENT

The Greenwoods further claim that law enforcement
officers and those administering the ordinance are unable to
determine

the

extent

and

(Appellant's brief at 14).

application

of

the

ordinance.

They go so far as to state in

their brief that:
"The registration papers, evincing a dog's
genealogy, are the only reasonably accurate means
of determining a particular dog's breed membership.
No other methods, observations, or perceptions
exist whereby breed can, accurately and without
great subjectivity, be determined." (Appellant's
brief at 15).
At the trial of this matter, witnesses on both
sides of the case testified over and over again that a dog's
breed membership was determined by the visual observation of
its predominate physical characteristics. (Record, Day 1, pp.
238-240;

Record, Day 1, p.51. lines 5-25 and p.52, line 1-2;

Record, Day 1, p. 24, lines 2-11; Record, Day 1, p. 60, lines
14-21;

Record, Day 1, p. 213-218;

Record, Day 1, p. 232,

lines 6-25 and p. 233, lines 1-12;

Record, Day 3, p. 61,

lines 10-25 and p. 62, lines 1-14).
North Salt Lake Animal Control Officer Jeff Tingey,
at the first day of the trial, testified that given the
opportunity to visually observe any dog, he could determine
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the predominate breed of that dog.

(Record, Day 1, p.22,

lines 8-11, 21-25; Record, Day 1, p.23, lines 19-25, and
p.24, line 1 ) .
that

visual

Animal control officers further testified

observation

of

the

predominate

physical

characteristics of a dog was typically how breeds of dogs are
identified in animal control, and that enforcement of the
North Salt Lake ordinance would not pose a problem to them.
(Record, Day 1, p. 24, lines 2-11; Record, Day 3, p. 11,
lines 11-16).
The

appellate

court,

in

determining

constitutionally where vagueness is alleged, is obligated to
construe

the

ordinance

in

a manner

that

unconstitutional infirmity, if possible.

will

avoid

an

People vs. Ortez,

479 N.Y.2d 613 (1986).
In the Ortez, supra, case the court stated that:
"The Constitution only requires reasonable
precision from the legislative drafting; it does
not impose impossible standards.
Ordinary
terminology may be used to express idea that find
adequate interpretation in common usage and
understanding. If the general class of offenses to
which the statute is directed is plain within its
terms, the statute will not be struck down as vague
even though marginal cases may be put where doubt
might arise."
Id- at 613.
The evidence adduced at trial clearly supports the
trial court's finding that the language of the ordinance was
such that the person of ordinary and common intelligence
would know

whether

or not his breed of dog was subject
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thereto.

The evidence also supported the court's finding

that the breed of a dog is determined by registration or its
predominate physical characteristics, and that the "pit bull"
breeds of dogs possessed certain unique characteristics which
make them discernible from other breeds.
Based upon the evidence, the court determined that
the North Salt Lake ordinance, Section 13-20-16E was not
vague, and that appellant's substantive due process rights
had not be violated.

That finding and judgment is supported

by the evidence and the applicable caselaw and should be
upheld.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT
THE NORTH SALT LAKE ORDINANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE I,
SECTION 24 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, AND THAT
ITS ENACTMENT WAS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE CITYfS POLICE POWER
The Greenwoods have raised on appeal, the question
as to whether

the North Salt Lake ordinance

is a valid

exercise of police power under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 24 of the Utah
State Constitution. (Appellant's brief at 21). Police power
includes

all

laws,

restraining

or

prohibiting,

harmful to the welfare of the public.
supra; Kalodimos

anything

State v. Hoffman,

vs. Morton Grove. 470 N.E.2d

266

(111.

1984).
The enactment of North Salt Lake's ordinance by its
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governing body was an exercise of the City's police power.
It is well settled that an exercise of police power which has
the effect of depriving a person of property will be valid if
it bears

a real and

substantial relation to the public

health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public*
Peck v. Dunn. 574 P.2d 367 (Utah 1978); City of Lyons v.
Suttle, 209 Kan. 735, 498 P.2d 9 (1972).
It

is

also

well

established

in Utah

that

the

constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is presumed, and
that the burden is upon one attacking its validity to clearly
show that it violates the Constitution.

Provo City Corp. v.

Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (1989); Salt Lake City Corporation
v. Savage. 541 P.2d 1035, cert. denied. 96 S.Ct. 1514, 425
U.S. 915 (Utah 1975).

Thus, an ordinance passed pursuant to

a city's police power will be held invalid only if it bears
no

real

and

substantial

relation

to

the public

safety, morals or general welfare of the public.

health,

In Grigsby

v. Mitchum. 380 P.2d 363 (1963), it was held:
Whether an exercise of the police power does bear a
real and substantial relation to the public health,
basic morals or general welfare of the public, and
whether it is unreasonable or arbitrary are
questions which are committed in the first instance
to the judgment and discretion of the legislative
body, and unless the decisions of such legislative
body on those questions appear to be clearly
erroneous, the court will not invalidate them.
Id. at 365.
In the present appeal, the appellants claim that
the ordinance in question is arbitrary and capricious because
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it selects for regulation certain breeds of animal.
is no merit to such a contention, however.

There

In City of Warren

v. Testa, 461 N.E.2d 1354 (Ohio Com. PI. 1983) the court
addressed a similar issue with respect to an ordinance which
prohibited the keeping and harboring of lions within the City
of Warren.

The Court stated:

It is a fact that other animals or various species
have the ability to bite and do harm . . . a fact
confirmed by witnesses on both sides of the case.
The Defendant's claim of selectivity of the
ordinance fails in view of the long established
principle of law that a legislative authority has
the right to legislate out nuisances as they are
called to said legislative authority's attention.
Perhaps the lion could argue the principle of
selectivity; however, certainly the City Council
has the right to legislate here, supplement later,
and address each so called "nuisance" as it arises.
Id. 461 N.E.2d at 1357.
The governing body of the City of North Salt Lake
determined that the breeds of dogs commonly known as the "pit
bull", the shar-pei, and the tosa, pose such an immediate and
serious threat to the public health, safety and welfare, that
an ordinance regulating their possession was necessary to
protect the citizens of North Salt Lake.

Though it may be

true that other breeds of dogs, as well as other species of
animals,

not

currently

prohibited

from

being

kept

or

otherwise regulated within the City of North Salt Lake's
limits are also dangerous, the governing body of North Salt
Lake obviously felt that the breeds of dogs named in the
ordinance pose a greater and more immediate threat of harm to
the

public

health,

safety

and
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welfare

that

such

other

animals.

There is certainly no Constitutional requirement

that a city must regulate all breeds or none at all.

Starkey

v. Township of Chester, supra. 628 F.2d at 197.
The
welfare

minimal

necessary

legislative

showing

of

uphold

the

to

enactment

is

relation

to

the public

constitutionally

illustrated

by

of

a

the decision

in

Quilici vs. Village of Morton Grove, 695 Fed.2d 261 (1982),
where the Court upheld an ordinance totally banning handguns
within the borders of the Village, stating that:
"...there is at least some empirical evidence that
gun control legislation may reduce the number of
deaths and accidents caused by handguns.
This
evidence is sufficient to sustain the conclusion
that Ordinance No. 81-11 is not wholly arbitrary
not completely unsupported by any set of facts.
Accordingly, we decline to consider Plaintiff's
argument that Ordinance No. 81-11 will not make
Morton Grove a safer more peaceful place."
This

celebrated

decision

is

a

significant

and

persuasive illustration of the broad scope of the police
power of a municipality as it pertains to instrumentalities
with potential to do harm.

Further, the Starkey, supra, case

held "The township does not have to regulate every dangerous
animal

at

the

same

time

constitutional muster."
The

court

in

in

the

same

manner

to

pass

628 F.Supp. at 197 (E.D.Pa. 1986)
Starkey.

supra.

said

that

"The

township could reasonably determine, as it did, that pit
bulls are dangerous.

The Township's Health Officer testified

that the regulation was necessary in this densely populated
Township the pit bull bites to kill without signal." Id* 628
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F.Supp. at 197.
As a municipal corporation, the City of North Salt
Lake is interested in, and charged with, the protection of
the

health,

governing

safety

body

has

and

welfare

determined

of

its

citizens.

that

the

breeds

of

Its
dogs

specified in the ordinance are dangerous and pose a threat to
the public's health, safety and welfare.

The governing body,

therefore, properly passed the subject ordinance to protect
its citizen's health, safety and welfare.
Substantial evidence adduced at trial established
that the breeds specified in the ordinance (commonly referred
to

as

"pit

bulls"),

are

dangerous

and

pose

a

greater

potential to do harm to other animals and people, than other
breeds of dogs.
determination

The City therefore was justified in its

that

without

additional

regulation,

those

particular breeds posed a significant threat to the citizens
of North Salt Lake.

The Greenwood's argument that the North

Salt Lake ordinance violates rights protected under the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1,
Section 24 of the Utah Constitution is groundless.
V.
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT THE BREED OF A DOG IS DETERMINED
BY REGISTRATION OR BY PREDOMINANT PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
In Section III of their brief, the Greenwoods argue
that the trial court made an erroneous finding that the breed
of

a

dog

was

determined

by
35

its

predominant

physical

characteristics.

(Appellant's brief at 24).

The trial court did in fact make a finding that
"The breed of a dog is determined by registration or by
predominant physical characteristics."
para. 9 ) .

(Findings at p. 3,

The Greenwoods do not challenge the fact that

breed may be indicated by registration papers, but they do
claim

the

evidence

did

not

support

a

finding

that

the

predominant physical characteristics of a dog determine its
breed classification.
The Greenwood brief recognizes that evidence at
trial concerning breed identification came from both sides
(Appellant's

brief

at

24).

In fact, evidence

at trial

confirming that the predominant physical characteristics do
determine the breed classification of a dog was overwhelming
from witnesses and evidence offered by both of the parties.
(Record, Day 1, pp. 238-240;
25 and p. 52, line 1-2;

Record, Day 1, p. 51. lines 5-

Record, Day 1, p. 24, lines 2-11;

Record, Day 1, p. 60, lines 14-21;
218;
12;

Record, Day 1, pp. 213-

Record, Day 1, p. 232, lines 6-25 and p. 233, lines 1Record, Day 2, p. 21, lines 14-17;

Record, Day 3, p.

61, lines 10-25 and p. 62, lines 1-14).
The Greenwood's suggestion that "the trial court
should

have

registration
objective
circuitous.

found
and

method

breed

pedigree
of

identification
charts

accurate

as

breed

only

such

by

are

use

the

identification",

of

only
is

(Appellant's brief at 25). Registration itself
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is based on a visual observation of a dog's predominant
physical characteristics. (See Statement of Relevant Facts,
supra at 9) .
dog

owner's

Pedigree charts themselves rely solely on the
observation

of

the

dog's

predominant

characteristics and his determination of the breed of the
parents of the dog.

The record below clearly supports the

trial court's determination that breed is determined by a
dog's predominant physical characteristics.

CONCLUSION
Based on the trial court's findings and judgment,
the overwhelming weight of evidence in the record and legal
precedent which supports the finding and judgment, coupled
with the foregoing arguments, the City of North Salt Lake
respectfully submits that the decision of the trial court
must be upheld.

KENT.L. CHRISTIANSEN, P.C.
N0rth Salt Lake City Attorney
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EXHIBIT "A"

Section 13-20-01:
"22.
VICIOUS ANIMAL:
Any animal which is
dangerously aggressive or uncontrollable, including
but not limited to, any animal which has bitten or
in any manner attacked any person or animal. Any
animal by its unique nature or breeding which has
known propensities to be aggressive towards any
person or animal."
Section 13-20-16:
"A.
PREMISES, MUZZLE: It shall be unlawful for
the owner of any fierce, dangerous, or vicious
animal to permit such animal to go or be off the
premises of the owner unless such animal is under
restraint and properly muzzled as to prevent it
from injuring any person or property."
"E.
HEREDITARY CHARACTERISTICS: Certain breeds
of dogs which by their unique hereditary
characteristics, owner training or instruction, or
mistreatment, have a propensity to be vicious.
These breeds include, but are not limited to the
Bull Terrier, American Staffordshire Terrier,
Staffordshire Bull Terrier, Tosa, Shar-pei, and any
dog determined to be vicious under Subsection B of
this Section."
"F.

LICENSING REQUIREMENTS:

The dogs identified under this Section:
1. Must be licensed under the procedures and
fees set forth in this ordinance.
2. Must be kept in a fenced yard, dog run, or
other structure which is at least 6 feet in height,
by 6 feet wide, by 10 feet in length.
3. Must be on a leash and properly muzzled
when they are out of a fenced area.
4.
Must at the time of licensing, provide
proof of a fully paid homeowners or rental
insurance policy containing a personal liability
clause in the amount of $100,000.

5.
The insurance policy, agent and number
will be recorded upon licensing, and the agent will
be notified if the dog is cited for violating this
chapter.
6.
These requirements must be met before a
dog license will be issued.
Section 13-20-31.1:
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY:
Any person required to
license any animal under the provisions of this
ordinance, or any person who is or may be subject
to the enforcement of any provision of this
ordinance in a civil or criminal proceeding who
disagrees with the interpretation or application
of any provision of this ordinance shall make a
written request to the city manager to determine
whether and how the provisions of this ordinance
apply to him or her and to the animals subject to
the provisions of this ordinance. During the time
that the written request is being considered by the
city manager, no criminal action shall be enforced
under this ordinance against the person that has
made the request. The city manager shall rule on
the request within five days after it is received
by the city manager.
The decision of the city
manager shall advise the recipient of whether and
how the provisions of this ordinance applies to the
request, and if any provision applies, the decision
shall inform the recipient of how many days the
person has to comply with the ordinance before the
ordinance will be enforced against him or her and
the animal which may be affected by the ordinance.
If any person affected by the provisions of this
ordinance takes the position that his or her animal
is not within the classifications established by
this ordinance, he or she shall make a written
request to the city manager under this section.
The city manager may appoint an expert to advise
him on matters requiring special knowledge. Where
an expert is required to advise the city manager,
the city manager may delay his decision until he
has received the recommendation of the expert.
Nothing in this ordinance requires the city to
dismiss any criminal or civil action brought by the
city pending his decision.

EXHIBIT "BI!

KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN, P.C.
MUELLER £r CHRISTIANSEN
300 IBM Plaza Building
420 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-3762
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
KATE GREENWOOD, et al.#

)

Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OP FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

)
)
)

CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, an
incorporated Municipality,

)
)

Civil No. 40876
Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendants.

)

This matter came on regularly before the court for
a non-jury
Honorable
presiding:
Kate

trial, on January 12, 13, and 27, 1989, the
Rodney

Page,

Utah

State

District

Judge,

David Paul White appearing for the plaintiffs,

Greenwood,

Breeders

S.

Andrew

Association

Greenwood,

(hereinafter

and

the

American

"Greenwood");

Christiansen of Mueller & Christiansen, appearing

Kent

Dog
L.

for the

defendant Citv of North Salt Lake (hereinafter HNorth Salt
Lake"); and the parties having adduced evidence by way of
1

testimony

and documentary

exhibits

and having

argued the

matter to the court, and the court having reviewed the file
exhibits and memoranda submitted by the parties and being
fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, now,
therefore, the court hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Certain of the plaintiffs reside within the

City of North Salt Lake.
2.

Said residents own dogs of the breed known as

the American Pit Bull Terrier.
3.

That plaintiffs own a kennel in North Salt

Lake which raises, breeds, boards and sells dogs of the
American Pit Bull Terrier breed.
4.
the

American

The plaintiff, Kate Greenwood, is president of
Dog

Breeders

Association,

which

has

its

principal office in North Salt Lake and which recognized and
registers the American Pit Bull Terrier breed.
5.

"Pit

bull"

is

a

generic

term

generally

referring to breeds made up of the Bull Terrier, American
Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire. Bull Terrier

and the

American Pit Bull Terrier and when the Court uses the term
"pit bull" it uses it in its generic sense.
6.

The

American

Staffordshire

Terrier

and the

American Pit Bull Terrier are generally recognized as the
same breed.
7.

The most generally accepted association for
2

registering and classifying dogs in the United States is the
American Kennel Club or AKC as it is commonly known.
8.
bulls11:

The

The

AKC

recognizes

American

three

Staffordshire

breeds

Terrier,

of

"pit

the

Bull

Terrier, and the Staffordshire Bull Terrier.
9.

The

breed

of

a

dog

is

determined

by

registration or by predominant, pnysiuax LuaiauLcustics,
10.

To

be

registered

a doa must

possess

the

predominant physical characteristics of the particular breed
as set by the registering association.
11.

There is no scientific method for determining

a dog's breed such as blood test# x-rays or scientific tests.
12.

The

combination

of

predominant

physical

characteristics determine the dog's breed.
13.
visual

The breed of most dogs can be determined by

inspection

of

the

particular

dog's

predominant

physical characteristics.
14.

All of the ••pit bull" breeds manifest unique

physical characteristics of the breed generally so that they
are easily discernible from other breeds.
15.
unique

The

"pit bull" breeds are known for their

combination

of

proportionate

strength,

agility,

aggressiveness, courage, intelligence, high tolerance

for

pain, tenacity and gameness.
16.

The "pit bull" breeds were historically bred

exclusively for fighting and killing other animals; namely,
3

other dogs.
17.

Worth

Salt

Lake

City

is

primarily

a

residential community.
18.

North Salt Lake City has experienced over the

years a number of bites and attacks by "pit bulls16.

These

bites and attacks are substantially nigner among "pit bull"
breeds than any other breed given the proportionate number of
"pit bulls11 in the Cityfs dog population*
19.

"Pit bulls" have killed other dogs, attacked

people and on one occasion attempted on numerous occasions to
attack humans through a glass door.
20.

In Salt Lake City, a neighboring community, in

1988 there were 295 dog bites; 28 were from "pit bull".

The

only breed with more bites in total number was the German
Shepherd of which there were five or six times as many as
"pit bulls" in the dog population.
21.

Bites by "pit bulls" in Salt Lake City were

proportionately higher than any other breed.
22.

Animal Control treats "pit bulls" differently

than any other breed:

They are kept separate from other dogs

and behind solid walls where possible; a breaking stick is
often required

to

loosen their jaws from the grip of a

victim; they are treated with more caution than any other
breed.
23.
breeds

they

Because ofc the reputation of the "pit bull"
are

acquired by certain people

4

in order to

capitalize on their reputation and natural characteristics
and make them mean and aggressive.
24.

In 1986, the North

Salt Lake City council

adopted the ordinance herein question.

It was amended in

1987 to add the breed of the American Pit Bull Terrier to the
breed specific portion or rne ordinance ana to provide for
administrative review for those aggrieved by the ordinance.
25.
concerning

The City considered the facts set forth above

the

"pit

bull" breeds

prior

to adopting

the

ordinance•
26.

Among other things, the ordinance categorized

certain animals as "fierce, dangerous, or vicious animals" in
terms of certain breeds which by their unique hereditary
characteristics,

owner

training

and

mistreatment had propensity to be vicious.

instruction

or

The "pit bull"

breeds

(along with other breeds not at issue here) were

named.

These breeds were made subject to special licensing,

confinement restrictions and insurance provisions.
27.

The ordinance also defined "vicious animals",

among other things, as "any animal by its unique nature or
breeding that has known propensities to be aggressive towards
any person or animal".
28.

The plaintiffs who own dogs of the "pit bull"

breed, named and carry on a business concerned with the
breed, filed this action challenging the constitutionality of
the provisions in question,
5

29.

The plaintiffs1 challenge to the ordinance in

question center around their claim that it violates the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the

N

equal

protection19 clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I,
Section XXIV of the Utah Constitution.

They further claim

that the ordinance constitutes an umawtui taxina.
From the foregoing

Findinas

of Fact, the Court

draws the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
the

Court

to

That the evidence adduced at trial requires
conclude

that

plaintiffs

have

standing

to

challenge the validity of the terms of the ordinance

in

question, in light of the fact that the provisions challenged
are applicable to them and will be enforced against them.
2.
ascertain

its

In

reviewing

any

ordinance

constitutionality,

this

or

Court

statute
is

to

bound

by

certain well-settled general rules of construction.
3.
strong

Legislative

presumption

of

enactments

validity,

are

and

endowed

they

should

with

a

not

be

declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis
upon

which

they

can

be

found

to

come

within

the

constitutional framework.
4.

They

should

not

be

held

unconstitutional

unless there is a clear and compelling showing that they are
incompatible with some particular constitutional provision.
5.

The

burden

of

showing

6

invalidity

of

a

legislative enactment is on the one who makes the challenge•
6.

The concept of due process, as guaranteed by

the U.S. Constitution
somewhat difficult

and our own

to define.

State Constitution

However, generally

is

it is

broken down into the concept of substantive due process and
procedural due process.
7.
concept
action.

of

Substantive due process generally embodies the
equal

The

characterized

protection

essence

as

N

a

of

standard

and

freedom

substantive

from
due

arbitrary

process

is

of reasbnableness" which is

similar to the test of ••rational grounds11 used to evaluate
equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.
8*

Procedural

due process

revolves

around the

idea of notice, jurisdiction, right of hearing and fairness.
9.

It is also fair to say that the two concepts

are not completely separate and that certain aspects of each
intertwine with the other.
10.
the

challenge

In reviewing any legislative act, in light of
for

violation

of

due

process

and

equal

protection, the initial inquiry must be as to whether or not
the

enactment

in

question

seeks

to

interfere

with

a

fundamental right or operates to the particular disadvantage
of a suspect class.

If it does, then the latitude given the

governmental agency is much reduced and the inquiry of the
court is one of strict scrutiny*

There must be a compelling

state interest to allow the intrusion or the classification

7

and the means chosen for such intrusion must be the least
intrusive possible.
11.

On the other hand, if we are not dealing with

a fundamental right nor a suspect class, the legislative body
is given much more flexibility and latitude in regulating and
classifying and the Court's only inauirv is to determine if
the object

of the

enactment

concerns a legitimate

State

interest and whether any classification Gears a reasonable
relationship

to

that

objective

and

whether

there

is

a

reasonable basis for the distinction between the classes.
12.

The Court does not substitute its opinion for

that of the legislative body.

The Court presumes that the

local authorities are familiar with local conditions and know
the needs of the community nor is the Court concerned that
the same objective may be arrived at by a less intrusive
manner•
13.

Classifications

are

not

unreasonable

or

arbitrary as long as similar situated people are dealt with
in a similar manner and people situated differentlv are not
treated as if their circumstances were the same.
14.

Classifications

need

not

be

applied

with

mathematical exactness.
15.

It is also clear that if a classification is

not arbitrary and is founded on any substantial distinction
or apparent naturax

reason which suggests a necessity or

propriety of the special legislation, a Court has no right to
8

interfere with the exercise of legislative discretion.
16.

The concept of vagueness is one which involves

both principles of due process and equal protection.

These

concepts require an enactment to be sufficiently explicit and
clear

so

as

intelligence

to

inform

what

vagueness

when

ordinary

person

the

conduct

the

ordinary

is

Drohibited,

enactment

exercising

reader

contains
ordinary

of

There

common
is

no

terms

which

the

common

sense

can

understand and comply with.
17 •
conjecture

It is not the Court *s duty to indulge in

that

the

ordinance

may

be

so

distorted

or

unreasonably applied that some innocent person might come
within its terms. The Court is required to assume that those
who administer an ordinance will do so within reason and
common sense, and in accordance with its language and intent.
18.

If there is a choice as to the manner of its

interpretation and application, that should be done in a
manner which will make it constitutional as opposed to one
which would make it invalid.
19.
does

not

The Court further recognizes that this case

involve

any

fundamental

rights

or

suspect

classifications•
20.

One of the major points of contention between

the parties is one of whether the breed specific provision of
the ordinance bears a reasonable, rational relationship to
the objectives sought to be accomplished and whether there is

9

a reasonable basis to specify the "pit bull" breeds for
special classification.
21.

The object of the legislation is obvious in

attempting to specify those breeds of dogs which constitute
an unreasonably high risk of danger to the public and then in
requiring certain precautions so as to reduce that risk.
22.

That none of the parties dispute that the

controlling of vicious animals and the protection of citizens
therefrom is a legitimate State interest, nor that North Salt
Lake City has authority to address the same by ordinance.
23.

That based upon the evidence adduced at trial

the Court concludes that there is a rational basis for the
North Salt Lake City council to have determined that the Npit
bull" breeds do have a unique combination of inherited traits
which, when coupled with owner training and instruction or
mistreatment, cause them to have a greater propensity to be
vicious.
24.

Further, that based upon the evidence adduced

at trial, the Court concludes that the breeds of "pit bull"
terriers specified in the North Salt Lake City ordinance are
breeds of such unique physical characteristics that they are
reasonably

distinguishable

from

othei

breeds.

The

predominant characteristics of the breed are such that a
person of ordinary intelligence and common sense would be
able to ascertain if his particular animal was of the breed
specified.
10

25.

The

Court

finds

that

the

fact

that

the

ordinance was not extended to other breeds similarly situated
or that it did not extend to all of the evils it could have
is not a basis for constitutional challenge.
26.

That based upon the evidence adduced at trial

the Court concludes the designation or -pit Dull" as a class
and the requirement of special licensing and the compliance
with special conditions and handling has a reasonable and
rational

relationship with one of the objectives

of the

ordinance, which is to protect the citizens and other animals
from attack by dogs.
27.

That the plaintiffs1 challenge to the breed

specific provision of the ordinance on the basis of equal
protection and due process fail even when exposed to the
slightly more intensive scrutiny required by the Utah Supreme
Court under our Constitution in the commercial setting.
28.

That

relative

to

the

provision

of

the

ordinance, which among other things defines a vicious animal
as Hany animal by its unique nature or breeding which has
known propensities to be aggressive towards any person or
animal"f

the Court concludes that the said provision is

vague and overbroad in that it v»ould leave the ordinary
reader of common intelligence at a loss to determine whether
his

particular

animal

came

within

the

purview

of

the

ordinance and thus could only guess as to its applicability
to

him.

Accordingly, said provision

11

fails to meet due

process requirements as to definiteness and therefore the
Court

concludes

vicious

animals

that

that

which

portion

define

the

of

the definition

same

in

terms

of

of
a

"propensity for aggressiveness as a result of unique nature
or breeding11 to be void for vaaueness.
29.

Based upon the evidence adduced at trial, the

Court further concludes that plaintiffs1 argument as to the
unlawful

taking

is

without

basis

in

law

or

rejects the same.
DATED this

, day of May, 1989.
BY THE COURTS

RODNEY S. PAGE
District Court Judge
Approved as to Forms

Datfid Paul White
Attorney for Plaintiffs

12

fact

and

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the

11I

day of

January, 1990, pursuant to Rule 26(b) of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court, I served four (4) copies of Respondent's
Brief to the following by hand delivering those same copies
to the following:
David Paul White
Attorney at Law
144 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

W^J

